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ABSTRACT 
THE QUESTION OF REFORMS IN EASTERN ANATOLIA AFTER 
THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN 1878-1885 (ANADOLU ISLAHATI) 
For the period of 1878-1885, "Anatolian Reform" 
(Anadolu Islahati) can be defined as the process of 
British efforts to make the Ottoman government introduce 
administrative reforms in its eastern provinces for the 
benefit of its Armenian subjects in order to prevent a 
possible Russian intervention in the region, which could 
endanger the British imperial route to India. The problem 
emerged and became an international issue after the 
Turco-Russian War of 1877 when the possibility of a 
further Russian advance threatened British communication 
with India after the Russian occupation of the eastern 
Anatolian provinces of the Ottoman Empire. As the 
protection of this communication was a matter of vital 
importance, Britain did not hesitate to put forth its 
sustained efforts to keep the Armenians in peace, and 
forced the Ottoman government to initiate administrative 
reforms. The Ottoman Sultan Abdulhamid II considered 
British intervention a threat to the integrity of the 
country and resisted the provisions of the treaties which 
obliged the Porte to introduce reforms. After the Turco-
Russian War of 1877, the Ottoman Empire lost most of its 
territories in the Balkans, hence, maintaining unity in 
Asia Minor became the foremost goal for the Ottoman 
administration. 
ABSTRACT 
BERLIN KONGRESI SONRASINDA DOGU ANADOLU'DA REFORM 
SORUNU {ANADOLU ISLAHATI) 
1878-1885 donemi iyin Anadolu Islahati, 93 Harbi'nde 
Osmanl1 devletinin do{Ju vilayetlerini ele ge9iren 
Rusya'nin daha fazla ilerleyerek ingiltere'nin Hindistan 
yolunu tehlikeye sokmasiyla, bolgeye olas1 bir Rus 
mudahalesini engellemek iyin, ingiltere hiikilinetinin, 
Osmanl1 hiiki.imetini Ermeni tebas1n1n yararina reform 
yapmaya zorlamasi olarak tanimlanabilir. Son savafta 
Balkanlar'daki topraklarinin 9ogunu kaybeden Osmanl1 
imparatorlugu i9in Anadolu'daki birligi saglamak tek 
91kar yol oldugundan Sultan II. Abdulhamit ingiltere 'yi 
oyalama yoluna giderek Ayastefanos, Kibris Antla9mas1 ve 
Berlin Kongresi'nde soz verilen reformlarin 
ger9ekle9tirilmesini surekli ertelemi9tir. ingiltere 'nin 
Mis1r'1 i9gal etmesiyle g\indemden aniden du9en sorun, 
Osmanl1 Devleti'nin Almanya ve Avusturya'y1 arkasina 
almas1yla 1895'e kadar rafa kald1r1lm19t1r. 
Chapter I 
Introduction 
For the period of 1878-1885, ''Anat:olian Reform"" can 
be defined as the process of British efforts to make the 
Ottoman government introduce administrative reforms in 
its eastern provinces for the benefit of its Armenian 
subjects in order to thus prevent a possible Russian 
intervention in the region, which could endanger the 
British imperial route to India. 
The problem emerged and became an international 
issue after the Turco-Russian War of 1877 when the 
possibility of a further Russian advance threatened 
British cononunication with India after the Russian 
occupation of the eastern Anatolian provinces of the 
Ottoman Empire. As the protection of this communication 
was a matter of vital importance, Britain did not 
hesitate to put forth its sustained efforts to keep the 
Armenians in peace, and forced the Ottoman government to 
initiate administrative reforms which should have 
resulted in the protection of the lives, welfare of the 
Armenians who populated the region intensively and, thus, 
a prevention of any further Russian advance and 
intervention. 
• Anadolu Islahati is the term used for the Anatolian reform 
process in the Ottoman documents. 
Mention can be made only of "attempts" at reforms but 
not "actual measures" since the Ottoman Sultan Abdulhamid 
II considered British intervention a threat to the 
integrity of the country and resisted the provisions of 
the treaties which obliged the Porte to introduce 
reforms. After the Turco-Russian War of 1877, the Ottoman 
Empire lost most of its territories in the Balkans, 
hence, maintaining unity in Asia Minor became the 
foremost goal for the Ottoman administration. 
In this thesis, which is based mostly on British 
official documents, I will elaborate the first phase of 
the "'Anatolian Reform"" process which mainly arose as a 




The Socio-BconOlllic Origins of the Anatolla.D. RefoI111 
1- Strategic Nature of The Region 
The name Armenia, in this paper, denotes the 
territory which was once held by the historical Armenian 
Kingdom and had been used by the Europeans for centuries 
even during the times that the Armenians remained a 
minority in the region. Thus, it has a predominantly 
geographical meaning. However, after the Treaty of Berlin 
it gained a political meaning and as a measure the Porte 
deliberately began to use the name Kurdistan for the same 
region, which also dovetailed with Abdulhamid's pan-
1 i 1 ' 1 Th ""' d • t d b th P Is am st po icy. e name .n.ur is an was use y e orte 
to represent the country inhabited by the Kurds but it 
did not denote a particular province of the Empire.~ In 
contrast, the name Armenia was unknown to the Sublime 
Porte and did not denote any particular region in the 
Ottoman provincial division. 
The northeastern edge of the region is a bastion of 
high mountain ranges and high valleys that vary in 
altitude from 800 to 2000 meters (Erzurum 1880m., Kara 
1800 m., Mus 1400 m., Erzincan 1300 m., Erivan 890 m.) 3 To 
1 i.e.: The reply of the Porte to the collective note of 1880. 
P.O. 424/106, p. 515-6, No. 256 in British Documents on Ottoman 
Armenians (B.DQA). Ed. by Bilal Simsir. Ankara: TTK, 1989. Vol. II 
(1880-1890) No. 20, p. 75 
2 P.O. 424/86, p. 147-8, No. 198 in BDOA, Vol. I, No. 247, p. 514. 
3 EI 2 , Armenia, vol. 1, p. 634. 
3 
the north of it lies the Transcaucasian Valley between 
Batum on the Black Sea and Baku on the Caspian; to the 
south, its highlands give way to the plains of Syria and 
Mesopotamia. Eastern Asia Minor, despite the rugged 
nature of its terrain, had often been a highway for the 
invasion of Anatolia.' From the plain of Cilicia the anti-
Taurus mountain ranges slope northward to Kayseri and 
northeastward to the mountains of Erzurum which extend 
southward to the mountain ranges of northern and western 
Persia. The head waters of the Tigris and Euphrates begin 
in these mountains. 5 
2- Trade Routes 
From the Persian Gulf one trade route ran via 
Baghdad and Mosul to Diyarbekir and across the anti-
Taurus either via Harput to Sivas and thence north to the 
Black Sea at Sinop or west to Istanbul, or via Malatya to 
Kayseri. Sivas was an entrepot on the crossroads of Asia 
Minor with access to the north, the west, and Cilicia in 
the south. Another route from Hurmuz on the Persian Gulf 
coast of Iran went to Isfahan and via Hamadan to Tebriz 
and Erzurum, where it connected with routes leading to 
the Caspian near Baku and to the Black Sea at Trabzon. 6 
On account of its geographical position Trabzon was 
the natural emporium of all the country to the south-east 
• Yale, William. The Near East, a Modern History. Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1968, p. 115. 
5 Ibid., p. 116. 
' :Ibid., p. 116. 
4 
of the Black Sea. The revival of the trade of Trabzon in 
th the 19 century dates back to the 1830s. Trabzon was the 
center of trafic for three important trade routes: 
Firstly, that between Europe and Persia, in other words 
the Persian transit, from and to the districts of 
Azerbaycan, Ghilan and Mezanderan, namely those of which 
Khoi, Droomeah, Tabriz and Tehran were the chief centers; 
secondly, in the adjoining and inland districts of 
Lazistan, Bayburt, Erzincan, Erzurum and 7 Kare, and 
lastly, the coast trade from Batum to Giresun. 8 The 
importance of the city arises from the fact that, as well 
as possessing a fair anchorage and a tolerable shelter on 
the seaside, it is placed at the opening of the only 
gorge, Degirmendere, affording a tolerable route, 
practicable in winter as in swmner, across the great 
mountain chains to the central lands of Anatolia near 
Erzurum and thence to the Persian frontier. The 
construction of the Trabzon-Erzurum road was started in 
1864 by this Degirmendere gorge9 in order to compete with 
the Russian Poti-Tif lis · 1 10 ra1 way. The road was a 
promising project of the time; it was about 210 English 
miles in 11 length, started from Trabzon, and passing 
south-east from Erzurum and Bayazid, cut of the north-
1 Accounts and Papers, 1872, Trebizond, Report by Consul Palgrave, 
f. 746. 
Accounts and Papers, 1868-1869, vol. 59, p. 341 
' Ibid. 
10 Accounts and Papers, 1868-1869, vol. 60, p. 432. 
11 Ibid. 
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eastern corner of Anatolia and communicated directly with 
Tebriz, Resht and Tehran.u 
The principal transport of goods to the interior, 
and especially to Persia usually commenced in the 
spring. This was due to two causes: the difficulty of 
communicating through routes covered with snow, and the 
extra expense incurred by caravans as they could not find 
grazing grounds in winter and laboured under the 
necessity of buying fodder and paying high prices for 
barley. However, during the winters communications were 
not interrupted entirely. 13 
The region began to lose its commercial importance 
after the construction of the Poti-Tiflis railway and the 
Suez Canal. Although the Poti-Tiflis railway (opened in 
1870) diverted from Trabzon part of the Persian transit, 14 
the latter route had still a great commercial value. In 
1877 the trade of Trabzon was 8 million pounds, 5 million 
of which represented the imports, most of which went 
15 
onwards through Erzurum. 
''The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 and the 
constantly increasing use of it by British shipping had 
:made the Eastern Question more than ever before one of 
imperial defense because of the importance this short 
u Accounts and Papers, 1868-1869, vol. 59, p. 388. 
u Accounts and Papers, Commercial No. 19 (1879), p. 1026. 
16 Accounts and Papers, Supplementary Report by Vice-Consul 
Biliotti for the Year 1873. 
15 This figure was according to a journalist, Lucien Wolf; Walker, 
J. Christopher. Armenia: The Survival of a Nation. New York: St. 
llartin's Press, 1990, p. 104. 
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all-sea route had quickly assumed in the public mind. 1116 
In the six years following the opening of the Suez Canal, 
Britain acquired a majority in the Canal shares (1875) 
when the Khidive of Egypt, Ismail, had to sell his shares 
because of 17 bankruptcy. From that time on Russia was 
aroused. Any challenging influence threatening British 
interests in the Eastern Mediterranean was detested by 
the British as the region became the crossroads to 
India. 18 Moreover, Queen Victoria was created Empress of 
India in April 187619 indicating the growth of interest 
in, and patriotic obsession with, the sub-continent. 
Thus, protection of the route to India became the 
cornerstone of British diplomacy. 
3- Economic Conditions of the Region 
The situation of Britain with regard to importation 
was quite different from what it was in exportation. 
Direct British trade had never existed to any great 
extent in the region, but indirect British trade was 
remarkable. The goods were sent to Istanbul and through 
native agents, mostly Greek and Armenian, were exported 
to Britain. 20 Between 1877-1882 there was a decline of 
240.000 liras(l) or of nearly two-thirds in the export 
16 Lee, Dwight E. Great Britain and the Cyprus Co.aventio.c Policy of 
/l'Z'!_· Harvard University Press, 1934, p. 11. 
7 Hairallah, Shreen. Railw4J'll i.c the Middle E46..t, 1856-1948 
(Political and Econ011Jic Backgrou.cd). Beirut: Libraire du Liban, 
1991, p. 6. 
H '.Ibid• 1 p • 7 • 
u Walker, p. 106. 
29 Between 1879 and 1882 only three British vessels embarked to the 
Trahson port; Accounts and Papers, 1872, Trebizond, Report by 
Callaul Palgrave, p. '''· 
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trade from Trabzon port to Great Britain. The export 
trade with other countries, reckoning also shipments by 
sailing vessels has augmented by 180.0001. between 1877-
1882. 21 Tiftik, a.wool produced by the sheep possessed by 
the Kurds, was the only article which had ever attained a 
certain importance in the exports from the Trabzon port. 
Between 1873-1878 it was shipped for a value superior by 
185.0001. to that since embarked. It was mainly brought 
to Trabzon from the region in the vicinity of Diyarbekir, 
but during the Turco-Russian War took the way of 
Iskenderun. After the war it began to revert to this 
22 port. 
Manchester goods played the most important part in 
British importation. However, they showed a decrease of 
185.3001. between 1877-1882. It was due in great part to 
other European red-cotton twist and woollen manufactures-
the first from Italy, Switzerland, and Austria, the 
second from the two last-mentioned countries- gradually 
having almost superseded these articles, which formerly 
had been entirely or mostly, imported from Britain. Red 
cotton-twist was in great use in Anatolia for the 
manufacture of cotton stuffs at that time, but besides 
its being dearer in Great Britain, higher customs duties 
were levied on British red-cotton yarn than those which 
affected the identical products of other countries. 23 
:u Accounts and Papers, Report by Consul Alfred Biliotti on the 
Trade, Commerce and Navigation in the Vilayet of Trebizond for the 
Year 1873 to 1882, p. 2085. 
n Ibid., p. 2084. 
" Ibid., p. 2086. 
8 
Exports from Persia to Great Britain were very 
limited but do not appear to have been susceptible of 
great augmentation as were those of Anatolia. Carpets 
were the main article of Iranian exportation to Britain. 24 
Cotton and woollen manufactures were also important 
articles of trade, but the quality of those sent to 
Persia were 
t 1 . 25 Ana o ia. 
far superior to those imported into 
One of the main causes of the decline of the Persian 
trade was the lack of those beasts of burden which had 
perished during the Turco-Russian War. The number of 
native caravans which had more interest than the 
Persians themselves in keeping up the transit through 
Anatolia, was reduced by nearly three-quarters and the 
Persian transit was naturally affected in both ways, that 
is in importations as well as in exportations. Hundreds 
of packages landed in Trabzon en route to Persia had to 
be yearly reshipped and forwarded by way of the Caucasus. 
However, the increase which is observed on Persian 
imports and exports during the year 1882 would tend to 
prove that an amelioration was gradually taking place 
with regard to the means of transport in this part of 
Anatolia. ~ 6 
The cession of Kara, Ardahan and Batum to Russia had 
deprived Trabzon of a commercial field of some importance 
but the extreme limits to which goods were sent from this 
24 Ibid. I p. 2085. 
lS Ibid. I p. 2087. 
26 Ibid. I p. 2076. 
9 
port was the same as before; that is to say, the country 
stretching from Erzincan to the west, Diyarbekir to the 
south, and the Persian frontier to the east. 27 After the 
war, the products of the country were sold by natives for 
more than they used to be formerly, as a compensation for 
the loss of profits previously derived from the Persian 
transit, which was than partly lost to them, and also as 
a consequence of the presence of the Russians at Batum, 
where vegetables and fruit were sent in large quantities 
owing to the high prices they fetched. 28 
The main cause of the unsatisfactory state of things 
was the impoverished condition of the Anatolian 
consumers. 29 Another cause which greatly affected transit 
was a protective measure adopted by merchants of Trabzon, 
which prevented the influx of caravans for a time at 
Trabzon. In order to be able to cope with the freights by 
the Tiflis route, which were far inferior in quality to 
those by way of Erzurum, a commission was appointed and 
rates were fixed which muleteers considered to be too 
much low. 30 
In 1880 trade declined. A rather serious damage to 
the Erzurum road, the Kurdish raid into Persia, shifted 
the trade route to Poti. 31 In April 1880 the extraordinary 
:n Ibid. 
28 Accounts and Papers, Report by Consul Biliotti on the Trade, 
Commerce and Navigation of the Port and District of Trebizond for 
the Year 1881, p. 746 
1' Ibid. I p. 736. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Accounts and Papers, Report by Consul Biliotti on the Trade, 
Commerce and Navigation of the Port and District of Trebizond for 
the Year 1880, p. 1106. 
10 
swelling of the River Harchut caused serious damage to 
the Erzurum road in Giimiishane 3.:1 Valley and this damage 
persisted during 1881 and affected the Persian transit 
negatively. 33 - In 1982 'nothing or little' was done on the 
road which still required repairing. 34 Finally, in 1983, 
this road was thoroughly repaired to an extent of 58 
· 1 35 mi es. 
4- Armenians in the Light of Socio-Economic 
Conditions 
The development of Armenian nationalism, the 
activities of the Armenian revolutionary committees and 
the relation between economic conditions and Armenian 
nationalism are beyond the concern of this paper. 
However, the socio-economic conditions of the region 
which led to unrest among the Armenians and hastened 
Armenian nationalism will be summarized in order to make 
clear the British concern for the introduction of 
reforms. 
In the 1850s Batum was a mere village, till the 
establishment of the Russian Black Sea Steamer Lines and 
the neighborhood of Poti raised it to commercial 
eminanace, surpassing in some respects that of any harbor 
"Ibid., p. 1118. 
33 Accounts and Papers, Report by Consul Biliotti on the Trade, 
Commerce and Navigation of the Port and District of Trebizond for 
the Year 1881, p. 736. 
34 
.Accounts and Papers, Commercial No. 22 (1883), p. 1247. 
35 
.Accounts and Papers, Report by Consul Biliotti on the Trade and 
Commerce of the District of Trebizond for the Year 1883, p. 1819. 
11 
on the Black Sea 36 shores. In the 18 6 0 s Armenians had 
established a colony in Batum and according to the 
British consul Palgrave their presence or increase in a 
town had much the same significance as a like movement 
among the Jews of Europe; "it was a thermometer to mark 
the growing prosperity of the place, and the extension of 
its monetary transactions. 1137 
In 1869 the British consul in Erzurum, Taylor, 
noticed that Armenians constituted a minority, which was 
involved in agriculture and trade and eventually 
controlled three-quarters of capital and commerce in the 
• 38 Th region. e oshiir (tithe) tax was farmed out to 
speculating capitalists, Armenians for the most part, who 
again sub farmed it to others. 39 In 1884, 5 out of 12 
commission agents; 18 out of 33 exporters; 19 out of 63 
importers, were Armenians in Trabzon. 40 The "higher 
moneyed classes" were pro-Russian and were supplied with 
41 Russian passports. 
The Turco-Russian War of 1877 created a demand for 
all kinds of provisions and this yielded the producers 
great benefits. The Armenian merchants in Trabzon and 
36 Accounts and Papers, 1873, vol. 65, p. 1154. 
17 Accounts and Papers, 1868-1869, vol. 59, p. 399. 
38 Simsir, Bilal. Tbe Genesis of tbe Armenian QuestiQll. Ankara: 
Publications of the Turkish Historical Society. Serial VII-No. 84, 
1990, p. 4. 
39 Accounts and Papers, 1868-1869, vol. 59, p. 379. 
40 I compiled this information from the tables according to the 
surnames of the merchants. Thus, these numbers indicate the 
ainimum number of Armenians in the business; Accounts and Papers, 
1884-1885, Commercial No. 22 (1885), p. 1084-6. 
41 Simsir, p. 5. In 1869, there were 343 Russian citizens in 
Trabzon, however, most of them were Turkish citizens, Armenians 
and Greeks, furnished with Russian pseudo passports. Accounts and 
Papers, 1868-1869, vol. 59, p. 338. 
12 
Erzurwn, had "done an excellent business" especially in 
b d d .. t 4:2 ran y an sp1r1 s. Travelers who journeyed along the 
Trabzon-Erzurum route during the Russian occupation 
observed that ''untenanted old houses were repaired and 
inhabited, shops were opened and visibly did a good 
business, the rates of freight doubled, in short, a 
powerful impulse was given to the Armenian trade." 
However, those who enjoyed the Russian occupation were 
certain Armenian merchants of Trabzon and Erzurum and the 
towns and villages near the road. The general situation 
of the region was deplorable, as was observed by the 
British consuls. 43 
According to the nationalist Ottoman Christian 
th intellectuals of the 19 century, disintegration of the 
empires and the establishment of nation-states was 
inevitable and desirable and was the only alternative to 
disorder, anarchy and stagnation. The spirit that 
informed any movement toward nationhood has been seen as 
stemming inexorably from inalienable rights mandated by 
its supporters, and any exercise of these rights 
consistent with a principle of self-determination has 
been thought 
" unopposable. 
practically irresistible and morally 
0 Simsir, p. 6. 
u ''Wherever I halted and made inquiries, people complained 
bitterly of heavy taxation and of the losses they had been 
subjected to for two years past from the constant passage and 
billeting of soldiers."; P.O. 424/77, p. 48-50, No. 114. in BDQA, 
Vol. 1, No. 116, p. 258. 
" Haddad, William and Ochsenwald, William. Nationalism in a Non-
.Nation.al State. Ohio University Press, 1977, p. i. 
13 
There were clashing interests and parties among the 
Armenians. Until the ''back to the provinces" movement, 
whose de facto inauguration was marked by a sermon of 
Hrimian and which became popular among the Armenian 
intelligentsia of Istanbul after the Berlin Treaty, a 
vast gap of mutual understanding continued to separate 
the urban and peasant Armenians. 45 Amiras, Armenian 
notables, controlled shares of imperial trade and 
industry, and thus, had little interest in revolt or 
upheaval despite the sufferings of their "rural brothers" 
. t . M' 46 in eas ern Asia inor. At the beginning of the war 
clerics feared that if they were annexed by Russia they 
would be swallowed by Orthodoxy. On the outbreak of the 
Turco-Russian War Patriarch Nerses Varjabedian issued a 
declaration advising the Armenians to show loyalty to the 
state and to work and pray for the Ottoman victory. 
However, kavagarans (Armenian villagers living in the 
provinces) tired of Kurdish oppression and Ottoman 
misgovernment were willing to welcome the Russian army. 47 
The Russians gradually restored order in the regions they 
invaded, "thus the Armenian villagers and townsmen had a 
reason for being discontent with their Ottoman masters 
'
5 Zeidner, Robert P. Britain and the Launching of the Armenil'J.D 
Question. International Journal of Middle East Stu_dll.s_ 7 (1976), 
465-483, p. 467. 
" Ibid., p. 470. 
" As early as 1862, Arminius Vambery, no lover of Armenians, 
during his journey to the East stopped at a village near Bayazid. 
When he asked the villagers why they did not ask the help of the 
governor of Erzurum against the brigands he was replied that 'the 
governor himself was at the head of the thieves. God alone, and 
his representative on earth, the Russian Tsar, could help themu'; 
Walker, p. 109 
14 
when Russia offered peace at San Stefano. 1148 At this date 
the Armenians began to question the legitimacy of the 
Ottoman administration. 
Thus, we can posit an Armenian mercantile 
bourgeoisie which fell into decadence and unrest because 
of wars and the changing trade routes. The weakness and 
demoralization in Eastern Anatolia, in contrast to the 
strength of the Russians in their Transcaucasian 
provinces, impressed the Turkish Armenians deeply as 
reported before the war by the British consuls. 49 Ottoman 
Armenians, on the one hand, observed the Tiflis-Poti 
line, security and so on in Russia, and on the other, 
were living under the oppression of the nomadic Kurdish 
tribes, suffering from the state of the Trabzon-Erzurum 
road which could not be mended for several years, and so 
on. During the Turco-Russian War of 1877, things had 
become worse; many Armenian families migrated to Russia. 
0 Zeidner, p. 471. 
0 Shukla, Ram Lakhan. BritaizJ. India and the 'l'urkuh Eiapire. 1853-
.18Jl2, New Delhi: People's Publishing House, 1973, p. 43. 
15 
Chapter III 
The Political Origins of Anatolian Reformation 
1- The Turco-Russian War and The Strategic 
Significance of the Region 
An extensive portion of ''Armenia" was annexed by 
Russia by the Treaty of Edirne in 1829. What was left to 
the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the Turco-Russian 
War of 1877 was Erzurum, Kars, Bayazid, Mush and Van, 
extending from Trabzon to the source of the Euphrates and 
from there to the foot of Mount Ararat. The remainder 
also had a vital importance for the British route to 
India. 
The war commenced in April 1877 and on May 6th the 
British government issued a proclamation of "neutrality." 
According to this proclamation, Britain would not assist 
the Porte as long as Ottoman interests were involved 
alone, but if the war endangered British interests the 
government would defend them. The Suez Canal had to be 
kept open, undamaged and uninterrupted; there must be no 
attempt to blockade the Canal and no occupation of, or 
attack on, Egypt; Istanbul had to remain in Ottoman hands 
and the existing regulations of the Straits should not be 
altered. 1 
1 Medlicott, M. N. The Congress of Berlin and After: A Diplomatic 
History of the near Eastern Settlement (1878-1880). Edinburgh: 
Frank Cass & CO. LTD, 2nd Edition, 1963, p. 3. 
After the Russian attack Russophobia revived in 
Britain and throughout the Turco-Russian War there was a 
flow of memoranda from British officers to the British 
Foreign Off ice on "Asiatic Turkey". They pointed out 
different aspects of the issue, but almost all of these 
reports reached the same consequences about the Russian 
advance. Annexation of "Armenia" by Russia was against 
the British interests at some points: 
Firstly, the geographical position of the Ottoman 
territories coveted, threatened or occupied by Russia· 
were of high strategic value to their Indian empire as 
well as their routes to it. Britain considered Turkish 
A~enia to be the avenue of Russia for approaching the 
Persian Gulf through the Euphrates Valley which would 
expose the western flank of India to danger. 2 Sir Austen 
Henry Layard believed that even if Brzurum and Trabzon 
were not ceded to Russia at the end of the war, the 
capture of Batum and Kare would enable her to seize both 
these places at any appropriate moment. Batum and the 
road by Kare to northern Persia, Van and Musul would give 
her the command of the whole of Asia Minor, Azerbaycan, 
and the Tigris-Euphrates Valley. 3 According to Lytton, the 
Governor-general of India, capture of Turkish Armenia by 
Russia would give her many strategic advantages: two sea 
bases, one on the Caspian and one on the Black Sea, a 
2 Shukla, p. 39-40. 
3 Ibid. I p. 59. 
commanding land position between them and an enormous 
military reserve behind her back.' 
According to Kemball, who was sent to observe the 
impending war between Russia and Turkey and the 
anticipated consequences of Russian success, these 
regions were inhabited by diverse races alien and hence 
antagonistic to the Turks. He observed that they could be 
easily assimilated by Russia. 5 
Temple concluded that Britain was in safe in the 
Persian Gulf and Shatt-el Arab as far as Basra, 
nevertheless, their position at Baghdad was threatened by 
Russian successes in "Armenia." Baghdad had an important 
bearing on the British Empire in India. He was very 
anxious about the possible occupation of Erzurum and 
Diyarbekir by the Russians and its effect on Arabia. 
However, free passage of the Bosphorus was a safeguard 
against Russia. Any Russian move from an "Armeniani' base 
towards Baghdad woli.ld be thwarted by a British force, 
which, passing through the Bosphorus and appearing off 
Trabzon, could threaten her position at Erzurum. 6 
According to General Simmons, Inspector-general of 
British fortifications,' if Russia possessed a fleet with 
a naval arsenal in the Bosphorus, British communication 
8 
with India through Egypt would be at her mercy. 
' Ibid. I p. 47. 
5 Ibid. , p. 4 5 . 
6 Ibid., p. 57. 
7 Lee, p. 40. 
8 Shukla, p. 46. 
Ottoman administrators were also aware of the 
British interests in the region. In his report to the 
Sultan, Ka.mil Pasha stated that Britain's concern was to 
protect her colonies of India and Britain required the 
g Ottoman Empire to secure this end. 
A Russian advance could also endanger the Suez 
Canal. In his report to the Earl of Derby, Layard stated 
that, Britain had free access to Suez Canal and it was 
unnecessary for them to think of an alternative route to 
India, thus it mattered little to Britain whether 
Mesopotamia and the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates, 
which would furnish 
hands of Russia or 
such an alt\native, were in the 
of any other power other than the 
Ottomans. However, he expressed doubt whether Britain 
10 
would maintain her supremacy in Egypt. In the late 1870s 
France was rapidly recovering her naval and military 
strength and was turning her attention to Egypt again to 
challenge British supremacy there. According to a 
dispatch written by Lord Lyons which was mentioned by 
Layard, France "was not unlikely to propose a separation 
of Egypt from Turkey" in a conference that might be held 
9 Ramil Pasa Evraki, 86/1-67. 
10 "But what security have we that the Suez Canal can always open 
to us? If France should obtain that preponderance in Egypt at 
which, according to Lord Lyons, she aims, could we at all times, 
and under all circumstances, when at war with her, or with any 
power to which her sympathies or interests may induce her accord a 
'benevolent neutrality,' or when under the urgent necessity of 
sending troops to India to deal with a mutiny, a rebellion, or a 
threatened Russian invasion, could we, I ask, be certain that the 
Canal might not be closed to us?" F.O. 424/63, No. 124 in BD.OA 
lol. I, No. 50, p. 139. 
for the settlement of the Eastern Question. France's aim 
was to place Egypt under a joint protectorate or to take 
any other measure to prevent British control of the 
Canal. 11 Thus it was of the utmost importance to secure 
the only alternative route to India, namely, the valleys 
of the Euphrates and Tigris and the approaches to them, 
:1.gainst Russia. This alternative route would render 
Britain almost independent of the Suez Canal. 12 
Secondly, a Russian invasion would threaten British 
:ommerce in the region, 13 though it was indirect and was 
Lnsignificant for income compared with the total British 
trade./ 
Lastly, it would have negative effects on the 
)pinions of Indian and Central Asian Muslim subjects of 
:he British Empire. The conquest of the Eastern provinces 
1f the Ottoman Empire by the Russians would produce a 
onviction of the irresistible strength of Russia in the 
?inions of the Central Asian states and Muslim Indians. 1 ' 
The only way to secure this route was to keep it 
Lder the complete command of the Ottomans and "to shape 
·itish policy as to be able to rely upon 15 Turkey." 
mball stated that while British interests in European 
rkey were 
:bid. 
:hukla, p. 61. 
:hid. 
merged with international rights 
'.O. 424/63, p. 86-9, No. 124 in BD.oA Vol. I, No. 50, p. 139. 
bid. 
and 
obligations, their interests in Asiatic Turkey depended 
for their protection on a weak ally, the Sublime Porte. 16 
2- Political Developments After the Turco-Russian 
War 
a- The Treaty of San Stefano 
Being defeated on the Caucasian and Balkan fronts, 
the Ottoman Empire lost Kars, Ardahan, Batum, Oltu and 
Bayazid in the east and had to submit to the terms of the 
T t f S St f On March 3rd 1 rea y o an e ano. 1878, the former 
Russian ambassador to Istanbul, a well-known pan-Slavist, 
General Ignatiev dictated the provisions of the Treaty to 
Safvet Pasha. 17 Then, he proceeded to Istanbul to obtain 
Abdulhamid's ratification. 18 
The rivalry between Britain and Russia found 
expression when Britain challenged the provisions of the 
Treaty in-which Russia had acquired the right to continue 
to occupy the eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire 
until the Ottoman Empire had carried out the requisite 
reforms for the benefit of its Armenian subjects. 19 The 
16 Shukla, p. 45. 
17 Simsir, p. 7. Article 16 of the Treaty of San Stefano read: "As 
the evacuation by the Russian troops of the territory which they 
occupy in Armenia, and which is to be restored to Turkey, might 
give rise to conflicts and complications detrimental to the 
maintenance of good relations between the two countries, the 
Sublime Porte engages to carry into effect, without further delay, 
the improvements and reforms demanded by local requirements in the 
provinces inhabited by Armenians, and to guarantee their security 
from Kurds and Circassians." 
18 Medlicott, p. 10. 
19 According to Salisbury "even if it be certain that Batum and 
Ardahan and Kars will not become the base from which emissaries of 
intrigue will issue forth to be in due time followed by invading 
armies, the mere retention of them by Russia will exercise a 
powerful influence in disintegrating the Asiatic dominion of the 
British government received a copy of the Treaty on 
rd March 23 , and Disraeli proposed to send an army to the 
region to occupy Alexandretta and Cyprus to 
counterbalance the Russian occupation of Armenia. 20 On 
April 1•t, the day after he assumed the office of Foreign 
Secretary, Salisbury stated that the issues should be 
settled by a European 21 Congress. In his circular, 
Salisbury's opposition to the Russian territorial gains 
in the East was twofold: "The acquisition of the 
strongholds of Armenia would place the population of that 
province under the immediate influence of the power which 
holds them; whil~ the extensive European trade which 
passed from Trabzon to Persia would, in consequence of 
the cessions in Kurdistan, be liable to be arrested at 
the pleasure of the Russian government by the prohibitory 
barriers of the coDDDercial 22 system." Holding the Valley 
Porte. As a monument of feeble defense on the one side, and 
successful aggression on the other, they will be regarded by the 
Asiatic population as foreboding the course of political history 
in the immediate near future, and will stimulate, by the combined 
action of hope and fear, devotion to the Power which is in the 
ascendant, and desertion of the Power which is thought to be 
falling into decay. 
It is impossible for Her Majesty's Government to accept, 
without making an effort to avert it, the effect which such a 
state of feeling would produce upon regions whose political 
condition deeply concerns the Oriental interests of Great 
BritainDThe only prov1s1on which can furnish a substantial 
security for the stability of Ottoman rule in Asiatic Turkey, and 
which would as essential after the re-conquest of the Russian 
annexations as it is now, is an engagement on the part of a Power 
strong enough to fulfill it, that any further encroachments by 
Russia upon Turkish territory in Asia will be prevented by force 
of armsD", Turkey No. 36 (1879), p. 1-2, No. 1 in BDOA Vol. I, No. 
72, p. 179. 
:io Walker, p. 111. 
;ii Ibid., p. 112. 
:i:i Ibid. 
of Alashkert, Russia would be in a position to wreck the 
23 trade of Europe. 
The defeat of the Ottoman army produced a general 
belief in Ottoman decadence and an expectation of speedy 
political change which raised the possibility of the 
Armenians turning their eyes towards Russia, and thus, 
the Russian threat was frequently exploited against the 
British diplomats by the Armenian leadership. As early as 
th March 20 , 1978, a "trustworthy" person who was among the 
leading Armenians of Istanbul gave Layard a memorandum, 
relating to ways of securing a "certain autonomy" to 
Armenia, and demanded British help. 24 Layard considered 
the demands of the Armenians as the commencement of a 
movement which might lead to serious results affecting 
British interests in the East and thought that it would 
25 probably lead to more harm than good. 
The Armenian Patriarch of Istanbul, Nerses, stated 
to Layard that if they could not obtain what they asked 
from the justice and through the intervention of the 
European powers, they would appeal to Russia, and would 
not cease to agitate until they were annexed by her. 26 
Also, an Armenian who held a post at the Sublime Porte 
implied that they would place themselves completely in 









54-5, No. 107 in BDOA Vol. I, No. 50, p. 139. 
346-8, No. 639 in BDOA Vol. I, No. 64, p. 160. 
remaining under Turkish rule unless they got what they 
27 
wanted. 
Britain, through the efforts of her diplomats, had 
pursued the amelioration of the conditions of the 
Armenian population. 28 The main British concern was to 
force the Ottoman government "to do all in its power to 
prove to the Armenians that it was determined to secure 
to them in future just and equal government and that 
Russia should thus be deprived of a pretext for 
interfering on their behalf, and that of raising an 
Armenian question which might prove the source of fresh 
difficulties to Turkey, and afford Russia a further 
opportunity of extending her influence and ultimately her 
rule in the Asiatic dominions of the Sultan. 1129 
Nevertheless, this meant a shift in British policy 
as itwas pursued during the war. Just before the Turco-
Russian War, British public opinion was divided and 
unclear as to how to make a choice between the "Merciless 
Turk and Barbarian Russ" but the British were "inclined 
to think that the Turk was the least liked of the two. 1130 
27 F.O. 424/68, p. 354, No. 644 in BDQA Vol. I, No. 65, p. 162-3. 
28 see. P.O. 424/70, p. 360-1, No. 587 in BDQA Vol. I, No. 71, p. 
175-6. 
29 Ibid. 
30 In his pamphlet 'Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East 
(1876)' Gladstone described the Turks in these terms: "It is not a 
question of Mahometanism simply but of Mahometanism compounded 
with the peculiar character of a race. They are not the mild 
Mahometans of India nor the chivalrous Saladins of Syria nor the 
cultured Moors of Spain. They were, upon the whole, from the first 
black day when they entered Europe, the one great anti-human 
specimen of humanity. Wherever they went a broad line of blood 
marked the track behind them; and as far as their domination 
reached, civilization disappeared from view. They represented 
everywhere government by force, as opposed to government by law. 
For the guide of this life they had a relentless fatalism; for its 
The Ottomans were considered to be "an ancient but still 
alien conqueror, resting more upon actual power than upon 
the sympathies of common nationality. " 31 However, the 
speedy Russian advance in the Ottoman territory and 
British imperial interests in the region shifted the 
government policy and in order to legitimize the British 
assistance to the Turks in the British public opinion 
they tried to transform the image of the Turks into 
heroes, especially by the publications made after the 
heroic defense of Plevne by Gazi Osman Pasha. 3 ~ 
Disraeli sent Sir Austen Henry Layard, a "zealous 
champion" of the Turkish 33 cause, as the British 
ambassador to Istanbul in place of Sir Henry Elliot who 
had returned to Britain when the Conference of Istanbul 
broke up. Layard pursued the Palmerstonian tradition of 
preserving the Ottoman Empire, in the British interest, 
during his office; it was him "more than any other single 
individual at home or in the foreign service, who brought 
the attention of the government and the British public 
the subject of Asia Minor and its relation to British 
interests and especially its connection with the route to 
India." His name became inseparably linked with the 
revival of the traditional policy towards the Ottoman 
reward hereafter, a sensual paradise." Salt, Jeremy. IlllPerialisa. 
Evangelism aJJd the Ottoman ArmeniUJs, 1878-1896. London: Prank 
Cass & CO. LTD, 1993, p. 45. 
31 Turkey No. 36 (1878), p. 1-2, No. 1 in B.DOA Vol. I, No. 72, p. 
179. 
Jl Salt, p. 45. 
33 Shukla, p. 90. 
Empire and with the attempt at its reform which was 
undertaken after the Congress of Berlin. 3 ' 
Britain could not risk the possibility of a war with 
Russia which could cause a "calamity" but she was 
determined to prevent any further encroachment by Russia 
35 
upon Turkish territory by force of arms. Thus, Disraeli 
went through the motions of preliminary mobilization to 
signal to Russia his intent to wage war. Britain spent 6 
million pounds on the preparation of its army in a very 
short span of time and compelled Russia to agree to the 
substitution of article 16 of the Treaty of San Stefano 
with the article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin. 36 
b- The Cyprus Convention 
According to Layard, in possession of Armenia and 
with straits open to her fleet, Russia would at any time 
be able to cut off the British access to India. In order 
to prevent this Britain would have to occupy Egypt and 
keep a powerful fleet in the Mediterranean always ready 
to 37 act. As this action was impossible 
Britain had to seek another remedy. 
at that time, 
Malta was an 
inconvenient base from which to prevent a Russian assault 
as it was four days' sail from the "scene of action. " 38 
34 Lee, p. 44. 
35 Turkey No. 36 (1878), p. 1-2, No. 1 in BDQA Vol. I, No. 72, p. 
178. 
36 Dadrian, Vahakn N. The History of the Armuti.AD Genocide: Ethziic 
Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus. London: 
Bergham Books, 1995, p. 67. 
37 Shukla, p. 58. 
38 Ibid., p. 74. 
Also, some other places were considered for occupation by 
Britain, like Gallipoli, Lemnos, Mitilene, Crete, 
Alexandretta, Acre, Haifa etc., but Cyprus seemed to be 
the most convenient base, largely on the basis of a 
confidential memorandum submitted by an officer of the 
Intelligence Department, 
S . 40 0 . c immons. ccupying yprus, 
Colonel Robert 39 Home, to 
Britain would hold the keys 
to Asia Minor. The island would furnish a base from which 
an anny could control any advance on the Persian Gulf or 
the Suez Canal either from the Caucasus or from the 
headwaters of the Tigris and Euphrates. Britain also 
would have a naval base which could easily be defended 
and from which the British warships could watch the lines 
of communication with India passing through the Suez 
Canal. 41 The British government would also avoid the 
trouble with France which an acquisition on the Syrian 
coast might entail. 4 ~ 
th On May 26 ,1878, just two days after the Ali Suavi 
incident, Britain proposed her occupation of Cyprus and 
Layard was instructed to persuade the Sultan to this 
d 43 Ali" en . Suavi, an ex-administrator of Galatasaray 
School, attempted to seize the 9iragan Palace with 
several hundred Balkan immigrants and restore the ex-
Sultan Murad V. But he failed and was killed by the 
39 Lee, p. 32. 
'
0 Shukla, p. 77. 
41 Ibid . 
.u Medlicott, p. 19. 
43 Turkey No. 36 (1878), p. 1-2, No. 1 in BDQA Vol. I, No. 72, p. 
179. 
palace guards. According to Medlicott, after this event 
the Sultan was on the verge of a nervous and possibly a 
mental collapse, and accepted Layard' s proposal without 
h · t · u. t ' . th Ott d t esita ion. However, we no ice in e oman ocumen s 
that the Sultan was quite aware of the course of events. 
He ordered the Council of Ministers the renegotiation and 
elaboration of the subject, 45 did his best to resist and 
only accepted the convention on the condition that his 
sovereignty should not be harmed (Hukuk-u shahaneme asla 
halel gelmemek suretiyleJ." 
On June 4th, 1878, Layard concluded the Cyprus 
Convention which was described by Gladstone as an "insane 
convention. 1141 In return for its willingness to protect 
Turkey "by force of arms" against Russian territorial 
encroachments, beyond Kare, Ardahan and Batum, Britain 
was allowed to occupy Cyprus. Besides, the Sultan 
promised Britain that he would introduce reforms for the 
protection of the Christians in the eastern provinces of 
th Em . 48 e pire. "This articleOoff ered to the British 
diplomatic and consular agents in Turkey 'an ample ground 
for remonstrances' or interferences, in favor of Ottoman 
Armenians." According to Salisbury, from now on, "Great 
44 Medlicott, p. 21. 
45 YEE 9-1094-72-4. 
46 YEE 14-163-126-7. 
47 Salt, p. 48. 
48 Article 1 of the Anglo-Turkish Convention with regard to Cyprus 
which was a supplement to the issue read: "His Imperial Majesty 
the Sultan, promises to Britain to introduce necessary reforms, to 
be agreed upon later between two powers, into the government and 
for the protection of the Christians and other subjects of the 
Porte in these territories" 
Britain would spare no diplomatic exertion to obtain good 
government for the populations in Asiatic Turkey. 1149 
c- The Berlin Congress 
Mobilization of the British troops and the internal 
problems of Russia (the war was costing Russia two 
million a day, and the losses from casualties and disease 
were increasing; nihilism and terrorism revived in the 
country and public opinion was sympathetic towards the 
revolutionaries) forced the Tsar, through the secret 
protocol of 29th May signed with Britain, to accept the 
submittal of all the clauses of the Treaty of San Stefano 
to the Berlin Congress and to redraw the lines of the 
Asiatic frontier between Turkey and Russia. 50 Russia 
refused to give up Kara and Batum but had been persuaded 
to withdraw from the Bayazid and Alashkert valleys which 
had the utmost importance for the route of India. 
Besides, once the Cyprus Convention had been concluded 
with Turkey, Salisbury felt assured that it would be a 
sufficient guarantee against the danger resulting from 
the Russian capture of Kare and Batum. 51 
At the Congress the Armenian Question was of less 
importance than the other issues, and so the Congress 
was a failure from the point of view of the Armenians. 
However, with the Treaty the question became an 
international issue. At San Stefano, execution of the 
49 Simsir, p. 9. 
so Medlicott, p. 19-21. 
51 Shukla, p. 80. 
reforms was tied up with the evacuation of the Ottoman 
territories by the Russian soldiers, but now the Treaty 
of Berlin put the Ottoman administration under a pledge 
of reforms which did not bind the government to the 
establishment of any machinery for foreign supervision. 52 
In this way, Britain did not let Russia become the 
champion of the Armenian cause and intervene in the issue 
by herself. Article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin, together 
with the stipulations of article 1 of the Cyprus 
Convention gave Britain the option of considering 
intervention and a willingness to use force for that 
53 purpose. There was no hope left for Armenians other than 
British protection. 54 
With the Treaty of Berlin the Ottoman Empire was 
forced to give up two fifths of its entire territory and 
one fifth of its population, about 5. 5 million people, 
almost half of whom were Muslims; Serbia, Romania, 
Montenegro were granted the status of independent states, 
Bulgaria gained autonomy, Eastern Rumelia and Macedonia 
were put under a special 55 arrangement. It also lost 
substantial revenues, though it was partially compensated 
by the tribute paid by the remaining vassals and the 
~greement of the newly independent states to assume 
·~ Zeidner, p. 470. Article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin read: "The 
lublime Porte undertakes to carry out without further delay the 
LI11eliorations and reforms demanded by local requirements in the 
1rovinces inhabited by the Armenians, and to guarantee their 
ecurity against the Circassians and Kurds. It will periodically 
ake known the steps taken to this effect to the Powers who will 
uperintend their application.", Dadrian, p. 106. 
1 Dadrian, p. 63. 
P.O. 424/72, p.68, No. 99 in BD.0A Vol. I, No. 74, p. 182. 
Dadrian, p. 31. 
portions of the Ottoman public debt. "In so far as 
Britain was concerned the Russian threat was weakened but 
for ·the Ottoman Empire the Congress of Berlin was a 
terrible defeat, depriving it of territory, people and 
finances and making it difficult for what was left to 
• ,,56 
survive. 
56 Salt, p. 47. 
Chapter IV 
The Introduction of the Reforms 
1- Reform Attempts Under Foreign Pressure 
As aforementioned, the key point of the British 
policy was to keep the peace among the Armenians to 
prevent Russian intervention which would endanger the 
British route to India. According to the British 
government the immediate necessity of Asiatic Turkey 
was the "simplest form of order and good government; for 
such security from rapine, whether lawless or legal, that 
industry might flourish and population might cease to 
decline. " 1 Fleeing from the advancing Russian army, the 
armed Circassian and Kurdish tribes gave impetus to the 
disorder in the region where they pastured their flocks 
and became a menace to the security of life and property 
of sedentary Christians. Moreover, it is probable that 
the Porte viewed the settlement of Muslim refugees in the 
eastern provinces as a deterrent to separatist plotting 
and uprisings among the Armenians.~ "The ravages of the 
Kurds •.• which were equally onerous to the Christian and 
the Moslem could only be suppressed by a police force of 
a military character, well found and handled; and until 
the suppression was complete, all other measures for 
promoting the prosperity of the country would be futile." 3 
1 Turkey No. 51 (1878), p. 1-5, No. 1 in BDOA, Vol. I, No. 81, p. 
192. 
2 Zeidner, p. 468. 
3 Turkey No. 51 (1878), p. 1-5, No. 1 in BDOA, Vol. I, No. 81, p. 
192. 
32 
British insistence on reform in the Eastern 
provinces of the Ottoman Empire where the Armenians were 
living started after the Treaty of San Stefano. Even 
before the signature of the Cyprus Convention, namely, 
before the Ottoman Empire's committing herself to the 
pledges of reform to Britain, Britain had forced the 
Ottoman administration to take immediate measures to 
prevent a repetition of the depredation and excesses 
which had been committed by the Kurds upon the Armenians 
of Erzurum and Diyarbekir. Layard sent British officials, 
Biliotti (British Consul for Trabzon) and Rassam, to the 
region for the purpose of reporting on the subject.' The 
governors of these provinces were highly praised by the 
consuls, however, it was thought that they should be 
provided with a sufficient military or police force to 
afford the protection of the Christians. 5 On May 10th, 
1878, Layard negotiated with Sadik Pasha and his 
predecessor Ahmed Vef ik Pasha, and noted the Prime 
Minister's determination to send a special commissioner, 
Ali Shefik Bey, to the region for the purpose of 
examining and redressing the grievances of the Armenians. 
Also, the military authorities on the spot were 
authorized to employ force for the repression of excesses 
by the Rurds. 6 Layard was thinking of appointing a consul 
or a vice-consul at Diyarbekir, or some other place on 
the borders of the country inhabited by the Kurds, who 
' P.O. 424/70, p. 360-1, No. 587 in BDQA, Vol. I, No. 71, p. 175. 
5 Ibid. , p. 17 6 . 
6 Ibid. 
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might keep the British Embassy informed about the events 
. h . 7 in t e region. 
With the Cyprus Convention the Ottoman Empire had 
undertaken to come to an understanding with Britain for 
the protection and better government of the Christian and 
other subjects of the Empire in Asiatic Turkey. According 
to the Convention the Sultan engaged to agree with the 
British government upon the detail of the reforms to be 
introduced. 8 The determination of the reforms to be 
accomplished in the European provinces of the Empire was 
entrusted by the Treaty of Berlin to a European 
commission which would be specially nominated for this 
9 purpose. However, a different course was adopted in the 
Asiatic provinces of the Empire: the need for reform in 
the region was fully recognized in the Treaty of Berlin 
and Cyprus Convention but the measures by which it was to 
be carried out were left to be devised and implemented by 
the Sultan in direct agreement with or under the general 
supervision of other powers. 10 The Sultan should determine 
the measures in the first instance, but the measures were 
to be communicated to the other signatories of the Berlin 
Treaty who reserved the right to supervise the 
application of them. 11 The measures which were applied in 
the Balkans could not be safely imitated in the Asiatic 
7 Ibid. 






provinces of the Empire. The Muslims constituted an 
enormous majority of the population of the region and 
were unfitted for institutions which were alien to their 
traditions. The Christians to whom a representative 
system might perhaps be suited, were not only a small 
minority, but were so scattered and intermixed with the 
Muslims that any separate machinery of government 
designed for them alone would be attended with the 
gravest practical difficulties. 12 
Lord Salisbury instructed Layard, on August 8th, 
1878, that the Ottoman government should accomplish the 
reforms in Asiatic Turkey, to which the Sultan was bound 
by the stipulations of the treaties without 13 delay. 
Layard should especially direct the attention of the 
Sultan in certain matters: establishment of a gendarmery 
in the Asiatic provinces which would be organized and 
commanded by European officers; establishment of central 
tribunals at a certain number of the most important 
Asiatic towns, which would have jurisdiction over lower 
courts and in each of which there should be a European 
learned in the law, whose consent should be necessary in 
every judgment; appointment of a tax collector in each 
vilayet who should be charged to convert the osur tax 
into a fixed rent-charge; appointment of governors and 
judges for a fixed number of years, at least five. 14 In 
the beginning, Britain was very careful to abstain from 
l:l Ibid., p. 191. 
13 Ibid., p. 192. 
14 Ibid., p. 195. 
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proposing the employment of British officers in the 
region as this might give a pretext for the insinuation 
that she sought to acquire any control inconsistent with 
the complete and disputed sovereignty of the Sul tan. To 
this end Layard was strictly warned by Salisbury. 15 
Britain intended to establish a kind of protectorate 
"under the guise of reforms. " 16 In September 187 8, Layard 
informed Salisbury that if a loan could be raised upon 
revenues of any particular province or provinces in Asia 
Minor, the Sultan "would be ready to confide their 
collection to an Englishman recommended by Her Majesty's 
Government." He added that "this might be a first step 
towards carrying out one of the reforms they required" 
and suggested this: "The Porte is in the most urgent want 
of money, and we may make use of its need to obtain some 
control over the administration of an important province 
in Asiatic Turkey. " 17 Another proof of this intention is a 
private letter of Layard to Salisbury. Layard stated that 
with British experts at the elbows of the valis, Britain 
might be able in time to exercise the sort of control 
established over the Indian states. 18 
Upon Salisbury's dispatch of 8th August, on August 
19th I 19 Layard placed a note verbal "in the hands of the 
Grand Vizier" with respect to the reforms. 410 
15 Ibid. 
16 Kiic;:iik, Cevdet. Osmanli Di.J?l011Jasisinde Brmelli HeselesiDin Orta ya 
~k.iqi. 1878-1897. Istanbul: T\irk Diinyas1 Ara9t1rmalar1 Vakf1, 2ncS 
~dition, 1986, p. 24. 
·
7 F.O. 424/74, p. 185, No. 303 in BD.0A , Vol. I, No. 90, p. 208. 
8 Medlicott, p. 296. 
9 see YEE 35-35/15-46-95. 
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After the note verbal of Britain, Layard had an 
interview with the Sultan (August 27th, 187 8) and found 
him sincere in his intention of executing the reforms. 
The Sultan stated that. he was about to appoint Baker 
Pasha, an English officer who had been in the Ottoman 
service for a long time and who was trusted by the 
Sultan, as a special commissioner to the region. He 
pleaded the penury of the treasury as an obstacle to his 
21 
accomplishing the reforms. 
Layard' s note verbal was submitted to Council of 
Ministers (Meclis-i Viikela) on September 11th. Layard was 
informed that the provisions had been discussed and 
accepted in principle. 22 However, there was a strong party 
at the Porte, including the Sultan himself, against the 
British proposals. The Turco-Russian War had stimulated a 
general hostility to foreign influences, and Britain's 
part in the transactions of the last two years had 
contained ambiguities and disappointments for the Turks. 23 
On 5th October, an article in the Phare du Bosphore, which 
was close to the Ottoman official circles, accused 
Britain of endeavouring to take from the Sultan his 
sovereign rights in Asia Minor, and was copied by the 
k . h 2, Tur is newspapers. 
lo Turkey No. 51 (1878}, p. 4-5, No. 2 in BDQA, Vol. I, No. 83, p. 
196-7. 
ll P.O. 424/73, p. 273, No. 453 in BDOA, Vol. I, No. 84, p. 202. 
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th On October 24 Layard received an answer to his note 
verbal25 after long debates in the Council of Ministers. 16 
In his report to Salisbury, he declared that the palace 
party opposed his reform proposal. They had tried to 
persuade the Sultan that to confirm these demands was to 
surrender and to put the Asiatic territories under a 
direct British protectorate. 27 However, he considered this 
reply a triumph in the circumstances as many of 
Salisbury's points were accepted and there was a 
considerable show of reason when objections were 
advanced. 28 According to the answer of the Porte, 
employing foreign officers as the commanders of gendarme 
forces and naming European lawyers as judges in big 
cities were against the customs (memleket ve ahalimizin 
adat ve akhlakina) of the country. Yet, they could be 
employed as inspectors of justice and military trainers. 29 
It was irrational (muvafik-i akl ve hikmet: 
olamayacagindan) to suppose the abolishment of oshiir in 
whole country, but the Porte was determined to change 
this system and was willing to try a new system in one or 
two provinces. 30 Governors, judges, and tax collectors 
were to be appointed for at least five year unless they 
committed any crime or offence which involved dismissal. 31 
With this answer the Porte put itself under a new pledge 
lS P.O. 424/76, 33-4, No. 23 in BDQA, Vol. I, No. 108, 234. p. p. 
l6 YEE 6-1702-82-3 and Kiit;:iik, p. 26-8. 
l7 F.O. 424/76, 33-4, No. 23 in BDQA, Vol. I, No. 108, 235. p. p. 
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of reforms which would be exploited by Britain against 
the Ottoman government. 
Meanwhile, the Armenians were seized with panic on 
the withdrawal of the Russians from .the region, which 
th 32 • 
started on September 9 • Russian withdrawal also caused 
panic in British diplomatic circles; the Russians 
encouraged this panic33 by the employment of agents who 
were inducing the Armenians to leave the country on 
Russian withdrawal. 34 On September 14th, Layard brought the 
issue to the Sultan's attention and was promised that an 
Armenian would be sent to the region as mutasarrif, or in 
some analogous ' 35 I h capacity. 'T e most stringent orders" 
were sent to the governor of Erzurum, Ismail Hakki Pasha, 
to take every measure for the protection of the 
Armenians. In reply, the governor stated that 
tranquillity prevailed in the region and the reports sent 
about excesses and anticipated massacres were unfounded 
and greatly exaggerated. 36 The appointment of Ali Kemali 
Pasha was considered, as a conunissioner, that is to say 
"as a kind of political agent, an office which formerly 
existed in the Turkish Pashalics," to deal with questions 
connected with the condition and complaints of the 
Armenians. 37 Consequently, Haci Huseyin Pasha and Musa 
ll Turkey No. 53 (1878), p. 193, No. 204 in BD.QA, Vol. 
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Pasha were sent to Erzurwn where they proclaimed martial 
law in order to provide security for the Christians. 38 
In October 1878, Layard constantly reported the 
rumor that Russia was planning to defy the powers and was 
seeking a pretext to attack Turkey again in order to 
advance her frontiers in Armenia. What alarmed both 
Salisbury and Layard was that Russia might obtain the 
acquiescence of Austria and Germany and by means of a 
renewed Dreikaiserbund feel free to do what she pleased. 39 
At that time, according to a rumor in circulation the 
Sultan and the Tsar would sign a secret treaty of 
alliance depending on the efforts of Lobanoff who was 
trying to regain something of the position previously 
held by Ignatiev. "Under the circumstances, Layard felt 
that he could not push the Sultan too far in respect of 
reforms, for he might either yield to Russian threats 
backed by force, or seek an alliance with Russia as the 
lesser of the two evils. 11 ' 0 
2- Appointment of British Consuls 
In order to keep the events in the region under 
control, Layard warned his government that a "good Consul 
should be sent to Erzurwn. " 41 Tenterden, the British 
Foreign Under Secretary, called attention to Layard's 
suggestion and the necessary treasury support was applied 
38 Turkey No. 54 (1878), p. 87, No. 112 in BDQA, Vol. I, No. 105, 
f9· 230. 
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for at the beginning of February. 4~ Major H. Trotter, of 
the Royal Engineers, who had been attached to the Ottoman 
army in Asia Minor during the war, had already been 
appointed as consul for Erzurum in October 1878. 43 He 
traveled throughout Anatolia with an Armenian 
interpreter, Serabien Sebian, and examined the region. 44 
Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson was appointed consul-
general in Anatolia with four vice-consuls to assist him: 
Captain Stewart to Konya, Captain Cooper to Kayseri, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Villiers to Kastamonu, Lieutenant 
45 Chermside to Bursa. Two other officers, Captain Clayton 
and Captain Everett were appointed vice-consuls at Van 
~nd Erzurum respectively, under Major Trotter. 46 The 
~onsuls were charged with touring the provinces, hearing 
:omplaints, observing the activities of the Ottoman 
•overnors and of the Kurdish tribes, assisting the 
urkish authorities with their advice, remonstrating 
gainst all cases of oppression or corruption on the part 
E the executive and judiciary, watching the introduction 
proposed reforms and ensuring their proper and 
.ithful application, and finally reporting all these to 
47 
e Embassy. The consul-general, Colonel Wilson, drew 
yard's attention to the terms of the berats "which 
nited the functions of the consuls to the ordinary 
~dlicott, p. 305 . 
. O. 424/76, p. 29, No. 20 in BDQA, Vol. I, No. 108, p. 232. 
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consular duty of watching over the interests of 
48 
merchants" and demanded extra political power. However, 
Layard replied that "the time might come when it might be 
necessary to insist upon exceptional political powers 
being given by the Turkish government to Her Majesty's 
consular officers in the Asiatic territories of the 
Sultan" but "the time has not yet come to this. " 49 These 
appointments excited the Armenians with the idea that 
they, at last, had a h . 50 0 European c amp ion. n the other 
hand, the presence of British military consuls in the 
region came across strong opposition from the anti-
British party in the Porte. Yahya Pasha, the Ottoman 
commissioner for the delimitation of the new Russian 
frontier in Asiatic Turkey, stated that by interfering in 
every matter, the consuls were practically taking command 
of the country and were encouraging the Armenians to gain 
. d d 51 in epen ence. 
The Armenian Patriarch Nerses was about to resign 
from his post in January 1879, under the pretext of 
protesting against the Porte's indifference to the 
promised 52 reforms. However, the real reason for his 
resignation was the clash between the pro-Russian 
"revolutionary" group and the pro-English "reactionary" 
group which revealed itself after the late war. After the 
Treaty of Berlin pro-Russian Armenians accused the 
'8 F.O. 424/84, 261-2, No. 300 in BDOA, Vol. I, No. 205, 413. p. p. 
'9 Simsir, 15. p. 
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patriarch of being a traitor to the Armenian cause, 
claiming that the Congress did nothing for them. When the 
Patriarch later on became certain that Britain would not 
support the Armenian. cause any more he made efforts to 
regain Abdulhamid's confidence. The Sultan granted him a 
splendid villa in Ortakoy. 53 
3- The Change of Government 
The Sultan brought Hayreddin Pasha from Tunis and 
appointed him as Grand Vizier in place of Safvet Pasha. 
According to Kii9iik and Lee, basing their judgement on 
British documents, the reason for Safvet's dismissal was 
his being passive and clumsy in the introduction of the 
reforms. The Sultan was planning to get the necessary 
loans by pleasing Britain with this appointment. However, 
later developments and the general spirit of Hamidian 
implementations leads one to consider other reasons for 
this appointment. This could be one of Abdulhamid's 
tactics of holding up the issue for a while. Also, for 
the very first time a Christian, Karatodori Pasha, was 
appointed to the office of Foreign Secretary. At the same 
time, Gazi Osman Pasha was appointed to the War Office 
and 11proved to be a thorn in the flesh of both Hayreddin 
and Layard as he had the ear of the Sul tan" and was 
opposed to all foreign interference in 54 Turkey. He 
represented the clique in the Sultan's retinue which 
53 Ingiltere ye Ermeniler, p. 32. s• Lee, p. 157; Ku9iik, p. 37. 
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constantly supported the Sultan's desire to increase his 
personal authority and safeguard it by a system of spies 
and secret police. 55 The appointment of a "liberal" and a 
"conservative" minister to the cabinet at the same time 
can not have been a coincidence, but must have been 
intended to pose an obstacle to the introduction of 
reforms. 
Hayreddin Pasha was known to have liberal ideas, and 
also seemed to be supporting the reforms. 56 Being tired of 
the Sultan's pledges of reform, Salisbury doubted the 
intention of the Sultan to satisfy any of the British 
demands except under the compulsion of inunediate 
necessary pressure and was against the view of Layard. 
According to the British ambassador, the Sultan's 
intelligence and confidence in Britain were sufficient to 
ensure the carrying out of the reforms if money and his 
own guiding hand were not witheld. 57 
4- The First Commission of Refona 
According to the British documents the new Grand 
Vizier chose Akif Pasha, the Vali of Sivas and former 
Governor-general of Baghdad, and Constant Efendi, the 
last Christian Miisteshar of Bosnia, to be the 
conunissioners of a commission to examine the conditions 
of the region and to elaborate the scheme of reforms. 58 
55 Lee, p. 157. 
56 Kui;ii.k, p • 3 7 • 
~ Medlicott, p. 304. 
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However, the commissions were composed of other 
officials. On May 12th, 1879, the Porte established three 
commissions: The first was sent to the north, Erzurum and 
Van, and was composed of the First Commissioner Yusuf 
Pasha, ex-Minister of Finance, and the Second 
Commissioner Serkis Efendi; the second was to the south, 
Diyarbekir, and comprised of Kazim Pasha and Abidin 
Efendi; and the third was to Halep and Zeytun district. 
Mazhar Pasha was the chief of this Commission and was 
assisted by Nuryan Efendi. 59 Later on, Veysi Pasha was 
sent by the Porte to join the Halep Commission. 60 Layard's 
proposal to appoint a British consul to accompany the 
i . d b th G d V' ' 61 b t h' comm ssions was approve y e ran izier; u t is 
council would not hold any official 62 status. 
Consequently, Major Trotter was assigned to accompany the 
first commission and Lieutenant Chermside to the third. 63 
The reform commissions, besides meeting European 
demands for reform, were part of an effort to re-
establish Ottoman control in the region, such control 
having been virtually non-existent since the beginning of 
the Turco- Russian War. The Kurdish tribes were raiding 
the Muslim and Armenian peasants, in the cities Muslim 
notables had asserted almost complete control. Armenians, 
59 YA-HUS 160/111. 
60 Turkey No. I (1880), p. 77-82, No. 83/3 in BDOA, Vol. I, No. 
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by taking the side of the Russians during the occupation, 
had proved their disloyalty. The Ottoman administration 
had no means to alter this situation, however, it was 
trying to regain its sovereignty by manipulating the 
Kurds and the Armenians. "The aim was to keep every 
element weak in order not to challenge the central 
64 power." 
The commissioners were given instructions about 
their activities. First of all, they would constitute a 
commission at once under their own presidency, whose 
members were to be selected from different communities in 
numbers proportional to the total number of inhabitants 
~f each community. Under this commission projects of 
reforms would be elaborated on the basis of new 
~rovincial regulations. It would conduct the introduction 
>f the reforms with the help of the governor. As soon as 
:he necessary legislation were completed it would be sent 
65 
:o the Porte. for approval. 
The commissioners would establish another commission 
or the introduction of the gendarmery forces on the 
asis of the gendarmery regulation which was accepted 
efore. 66 
They were authorized to change the old members of 
he Administrative Council (Idare Meclisi) and to replace 




them by others, 
functionaries. 67 
to dismiss incompetent and corrupt 
The general tendency of these instructions was to 
give large powers to the commissioners, yet, in many 
instances their power was reduced to nothing as they had 
to get permission from the Porte wherever increased 
expenditure was to be incurred. "This proviso at once 
precluded any steps being taken, without special sanction 
from the Porte, to organize a gendarmery, or to 
reorganize the general administration of the country ... " 68 
Also, their power was seriously reduced by the 
telegraphic instructions sent by the Porte since the 
conunission' s arrival. Thus, they were reduced to the 
position of simple inspectors. 
The Halep-Zeytun commission selected one Protestant, 
one Catholic, one Muslim and five Gregorian Armenians in 
Zeytun as a representative body and decided to divide the 
district into f h . 69 our na .iyes. The headmen of the 30 
conununities and villages in the vicinity were summoned 
and these formed a body of 29 electors (14 Muslim, 15 
Christian) who elected 8 of their number as members 
eligible to the Administrative Council; and from these 8, 
67 Ibid. 
68 P.O. 424/86, p. 100-3 No. 149, in BDQA, Vol. I, No. 238, p. 499. 
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P.O. 424/106, p. 90, No. 47/6, in BDOA, Vol. I, No. 320, p. 623. 
69 Turkey No. I (1880), p. 77-82, No. 83/3 in BDQA, Vol. I, No. 
206, p. 419. 
47 
4 of them would be elected by the conunissioners. 70 A 
conunittee had been appointed under the presidency of an 
official of the Land Revenue Office (Emlak Tahrirati 
Meclisi), who was considered a fanatic by Lieutenant 
Chermside, 
taxation. 71 
to address the grievances arising from 
The commissioners asked for authority to establish a 
mixed force of rural police under the name of 'harifs' 
and invited Zeytun Rushtu Bey, a member of the Gendarmery 
Commission who was in the country on business connected 
with the establishment of the Circassian emigrants, to 
7:l 
assist in the reorganization of the gendarmery. 
In Halep, a local consultative council met in June 
and passed a number of sensible and constructive 
proposals thanks to the freedom of discussion allowed by 
h . . 73 t e commissioners. 
Britain was not content with the deeds of the 
commissions. British consuls, Henderson and Lieutenant 
Chermside, who accompanied the Zeytun Commission 
condemned "the conduct of Mazhar Pasha and treatment of 
Christians of Zeytun" in a telegram sent to the British 
74 Embassy and made the British Embassy press for Veysi 
Pasha and Mazhar Pasha's immediate dismissal from the 
reform commission. 75 However, the Porte was desperate. The 
70 Ibid., p. 420. 
71 Ibid. I p. 419. 
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Grand Vizier stated that "the Porte was placed in a very 
difficult position in this way, that no Turkish official 
would ever be safe or willing to serve, if on the mere 
complaint or veto of an English agent, who might be 
misled by interested persons, or who might commit an 
error in judgment, he was to be recalled or made to 
undergo some other punishment ... It was fair that the 
accusations brought against the Turkish officials by 
British agents should first be properly substantiated 
before the Porte was called upon to act with severity 
against them. " 76 
On June 5th, 1879, Layard protested, with a note 
verbal, against the failure of the Zeytun Commission to 
"afford justice and redress to the Christian inhabitants 
th 
of Zeytun" and on July 13 threatened the Grand Vizier 
and Minister for Foreign Affairs with the severance of 
relations with them unless Mazhar Pasha was recalled. 77 In 
his report to Sandison, Layard stated that the "conduct 
of the head of that ( Zeytun) commission was a public 
scandal, and that he had completely lost the respect and 
confidence of persons of all classes."78 Layard added that 
Veysi Pasha and Mazhar Pasha treated all the Zeytun 
inhabitants as rebels79 and the only measure apparently 
taken by the Commission was to order the erection of a 
76 Ibid. 
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large barrack at Zeytun with the object of military 
t . 80 occupa ion. "Mazhar Pasha has completely identified 
himself with the interests of the fanatical party at 
Constantinople. The gross abuse of his extraordinary 
powers of patronage, and baneful effect of his actions 
and conduct paralyzed that of the Vali0"81 
Likewise, the Second Commissioner Nuryan Efendi was 
accused by the British Consul Henderson, of being a 
partisan of France and of supporting the Roman Catholic 
. . s . 8:2 priests in yria. 
The imperial commission for the reform of Erzurum 
and Van arrived in Erzurum in late May, 1879. 83 They had 
received telegraphic orders from the Porte in June 1879, 
to submit monthly reports of the progress made in Turkish 
for the Porte, and in French for communication to the 
84 
ambassadors. The most important progress they made in 
three weeks was to establish a sub-committee to discuss 
the gendarmery reform, whose members would come from each 
district and be nominated by the Vali. 85 They also dwelt 
upon repressing the revolt in Dersim and amongst the 
Mutki Kurds. 86 Yusuf Pasha appeared to be keen on 
introducing the reforms. 
90 • P.O. 424/84, p. 282, No. 216 1n BDQA, Vol. I, No. 204, p. 412. 
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In preparing to carry out the first instruction 
which was given to the conunissioners by the Porte, namely 
constitution of a local commission, an important 
difference of opinion arose between the first and the 
second commissioners. The First Commissioner Yusuf Pasha 
affirmed that the number of Muslim and Christian 
representatives of the commission should be proportional 
to the total number of Muslims including Turks and 
Kurds, on the one hand, and the total number of 
Christians on the other. Second Commissioner Serkis 
Efendi was against this proposal, claiming that as a 
large portion of the nomadic Kurds did not pay taxes to 
the state and failed to contribute to the supply of 
soldiers, such members of the community had no right to 
representation, and therefore that these elements should 
be excluded from calculation. According to the direction 
of the Porte on the clashing views of the commissioners, 
the original instructions were to be carried out. 87 The 
commissioners called a consultative council, comprising 
38 members, 10 Christians and 28 Muslims, from amongst 
the non-official inhabitants of the city of Erzurum. 
Also, a sub-commission was established to investigate the 
events in Geghi district. According to Trotter, "the idea 
of such a parliament ever coming to any satisfactory 
practical conclusions in a reasonable time was almost too 
absurd to waste a thought on. 1188 




The Commission found the situation at Mush "complete 
anarchy" 89 The troops were even worse than the Kurds. 90 
There had been movements of troops as a consequence of 
their dismissal to their homes and on their marches they 
91 ill-treated the peasants, demanding provision and cash. 
The Erzurum-Van Commission had made several 
proposals to the Porte but did not receive any answer to 
most of them. The proposal of the opening of postal and 
direct telegraphic communication between Erzurum and Van 
and direct postal communication between Erzurum, Erzincan 
and Harput was not answered by the Porte. The proposal of 
exempting the village communities from taxation on 
account of supplies provided for the army during the war 
also did not receive 9:1 an answer. The proposal of 
extension of the latest date for accepting kaime in 
payment of ancient debts due to the government, and the 
proposal of the Reform Commission to change the members 
of Idare Meclisi were accepted by the Porte. The proposal 
regarding a new gendarmery was to be submitted for 
consultation to the Diyarbekir Reform Commission which 
had proposed a scheme for that province by which an 
efficient gendarmery was to be introduced without 
. d d' 93 increase expen 1ture. 
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Lack of mutual cooperation between the Vali Fosfor 
Mustafa Pasha, ex-Minister of War, and the first 
Commissioner Yusuf Pasha, also prevented progress in the 
execution of the reforms. 94 "The want of support from 
Constantinople, together with the very lukewarm aid given 
by the Vali, has had a very perceptible effect of cooling 
down the energy and ardor with which the commissioners 
commenced their labors. 1195 
th On July 20 , 1879, Layard addressed to the Porte a 
note verbal urging the desirability of employing European 
officers in the organization of the gendarmery for the 
province of Erzurum to prevent the "ill-treatment and 
oppression of the Christian population by the local 
Mussulman Chiefs"96 and for the very first time, on 29th 
July, pressed the appointment of Baker Pasha to a high 
command in d . 97 Kur .i.stan. According to the British 
government the most important point of the reforms was 
the independent _command of gendarmery to a European 
officer; "without it all would fail." 98 But, as the Porte 
had more urgent problems like the Greek frontier issue 
and Egypt, the Armenian question was of less importance 
that time. 99 
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The struggle between Osman and Hayreddin Pashas 
resulted in the resignation of the latter on 28th July, 
1879. Aarifi Pasha was appointed as Grand Vizier and 
Safvet Pasha as foreign minister. 100 They remained in 
their posts for three months. 
5- Military Encounter With Britain (Donanma 
Neselesi) 
th On October 13 , 1879, the Sultan changed the members 
of the cabinet and appointed Kiichiik Said Pasha as Prime 
Minister. The appointment of Kamil Pasha as 
undersecretary (Miisteshar) of the Ministry of Interior 
was not welcomed by Britain. His appointment was also 
resented by both Savvas and Said Pashas. 101 
The Sultan also recalled Mahmut Nedim Pasha from 
exile and appointed him to the Ministry of the Interior. 
He was known to be a pro-Russian and a former friend of 
Ignatiev. 102 Rumors about Nedim's appointment to this high 
post had spread in Istanbul as early as June. Upon the 
instruction of Salisbury, Layard sent a message to the 
Sultan that Nedim' s appointment to a high post "must 
necessarily bring about an entire change in the policy of 
Britain as regards Turkey. 11103 
This change was considered to be "deplorable" and an 
incline towards Russia104 by Britain and led them to 
100 Medlicott, p. 320-1. 
101 F.O. 424/89, p. 80, No. 257 in BDQA, Vol. I, No. 302, p. 597. 
lOl Kii<;?iik, p. 49. The Pasha was called "Nedimof" by his opponents. 
1~ Medlicott, p. 318. 
104 Kii<;!iik, p. 50. 
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insist on the reforms. 105 On October 22nd, Layard pressed 
the Porte for the implementation of the reforms using the 
"strongest language" to the new Prime Minister. He 
threatened Said Pasha that unless the reforms were put 
into effect without delay and Christians of Asia Minor 
received full protection and their rights, Britain could 
no longer support Turkey; and warned him that the 
Sultan's throne and Empire would be in "immediate 
106 danger." 
Upon these events, on 25th October, the British fleet 
at Malta was ordered to proceed to Ottoman waters. This 
caused panic in the Palace. The Sultan sent a message to 
Layard and implied that he would appeal to Russia unless 
the British fleet withdrew. 107 Layard stated that he was 
ignorant of this mobilization and would obtain 
information about it as . bl 108 soon as possi e. Layard was 
also suprised at this maneuver and found it too severe. 
He used conciliatory language and stated to the Grand 
Vizier that this must not be taken as a hostile action. 
It was the result of British party politics "to close the 
h f h 1 d . 109 mout so t e Ga stonians'." 
This event increased Abdulhamid's irritation against 
Britain. According to the Sultan this was a violation of 
105 P.O. 424/88, p. 166, No. 232 in BDQA, Vol. I, No. 270, p. 570. 
106 P.O. 424/88, p. 232-3, No. 289 in BDQA, Vol. I, No. 274, p. 
575. 
107 Ibid. 
108 YA-HUS 162/97. 
109 Ibid. 
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his sovereign rights and he stated that he should 
"certainly seek the means of defending his Empire."110 
Musurus Pasha, the Ottoman ambassador to London, 
promised Salisbury that there should be no change in the 
foreign policy of the Ottoman Empire, that reforms should 
be introduced without delay, and that Baker Pasha should 
be appointed to an independent command of the 
111 gendarmery. The following day Abdulhamid promised to 
come to a satisfactory understanding upon the reforms 
with Britain if the British fleet were to be called 
back. 11:z The Sultan said that Britain was very hard upon 
him, even much more so than Russia, and that British 
demands and pretentions were such that he could not, 
consistent with his independence and dignity, yield to 
them. 113 
In return for the promises of the Ottoman government 
Britain did not send her fleet 114 and pledged to get 
Ottoman permission before any naval mobilization in 
115 Ottoman waters. However, Layard warned the Sultan that 
the British government would not be satisfied unless 
Baker Pasha was given an independent command in "Armenia" 
or in some disturbed district where he could be of real 
llO P.O. 424/88, p. 310, No. 416 in BDQA, Vol. I, No. 281, 581. p . 
. 11 Medlicott, 331. p . 
. lll P.O. 424/88, 314, No. 427 in BDQA, Vol. I, No. 283, 582. p. p. 
13 P.O. 424/90, 68-9, No. 96 in BDQA, Vol. I, No. 317, 616. p. p. 
u YA-HUS 162/108. 
15 YA-HUS 162/123. 
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use. 116 Moreover, Britain was ready to seek the employment 
of another European officer in addition to Baker Pasha. 117 
The Ottoman government took some measures concerning 
the reforms in order to impress the British government. 
Said Pasha's recommendations in the Zeytun affair were 
accepted by the Council of Ministers118 and the Armenian 
prisoners were released through the efforts of the Zeytun 
C . • 119 OlDinl.SSl.On. The Armenian brigands were amnestied in 
November 1879. 120 On November 14th, the Sultan issued an 
irade authorizing the immediate implementation of the 
reforms recommended by the Council of Ministers. After 
these steps, Lord Salisbury stated that for the present 
the fleet should not move into Turkish waters, but he 
could not promise anything for the future; and he could 
give no undertaking that Britain would abstain from 
active measures if nothing were done to satisfy the 
promises which the government of the Sultan had given. 121 
6- The Second Commission of Reform 
th Baker Pasha was invited to the palace on 8 November 
to discuss with others a scheme for the reorganization of 
the Ottoman army prepared by the Sultan's French adviser 
Dreysse. 122 Suleyman Bey and Mehmed Said Pasha, the 
116 P.O. 424/89, p. 80, No. 117 in BDQA, Vol. I, No. 297, p. 591. 
117 P.O. 424/89, p. 69, No. 100 in BDQA, Vol. I, No. 296, p. 591. 
118 P.O. 424/89, p. 55, No. 56 in BDQA, Vol. I, No. 287, p. 585. 
119 P.O. 424/89, p. 225, No. 269 in BnoA, Vol. I, No. 308, p. 601. 
no Simsir, p. 21. 
in Turkey No. 7 (1880), p. 8-12, No. S in BD.QA, Vol II, No. S p. 
19. 
lll Medlicott, p. 332. 
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Mutasarrif of Thessaly, Colonel Shakir (in whom Baker had 
great confidence), Colonel Tahir (formerly connected with 
the British police service in India), Captain Shakir (of 
Greek origin), and Lieutenant Yusuf were assigned 
accompany to Baker Pasha in his mission. 123 Mehmed Said's 
appointment 
124 government. 
was also welcomed by the British 
Baker Pasha left th for Alexandretta on 29 November 
but he was not given any instructions under the pretext 
that they were not quite ready. The instructions would be 
125 brought by Siileyman Bey a day or two days later. The 
delay was probably to prevent Layard from seeing the 
126 instructions before Baker's departure. 
The reform commission was welcomed (kemal -i tantana 
ve debdebe ile) at Aleppo both by the Governor Said Pasha 
and by the Christians of the city. Baker made several 
confidential interviews with the governor and the British 
consul. This was considered by the reporter, Siileyman 
Pasha, to be against the interests of the state as the 
governor was acting as an agent of the British consul. 127 
The governor was never trusted by the Turkish members of 
the commission. He was considerd a frivolous (hafifii '1 
meshreb) man and an admirer of French culture (frengiyii'l 
etvar). He was not suitable for the post, as the 
n 3 YEE 14-2335/1-126-11. 
n 4 Turkey No. 4 (1890), p. 163, No. 124 in BDQA, Vol. I, No. 313, 
P:· 608. 
ls Medlicott, p. 339. 
n 6 Ibid. 
ll7 YEE 14-2335/1-126-11, p. 1. 
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population of Aleppo consisted of pious Arabs. 128 His 
dismissal was forcefully recommended to the Porte. 129 
The commission went to Birecik, Urfa, Siverek, 
Diyarbekir, Harput, Keban, Sivas, Karahisar-i Sharki, 
Erzincan, and Erzurum. The people of Urfa were peaceful 
and loyal to the state. But because of the clash of two 
Kurdish tribes Christians and other subjects were in the 
habit of fleeing to the mountains. 130 
Baker and Mehmed Said Pashas arrived in Diyarbekir 
on January 19th, 1880. This commission also had no 
administrative powers. This was understood by the public 
when the Imperial Firman was read in the Neclis and 
inhabitants ceased to take much interest in the matter. 131 
The deeds of the Armenian priests at Diyarbekir were 
quite disturbing to the commissioners. The patriarchate 
acted as an embassy in the region, and the clerics as its 
consuls . They excited the Armenians towards 
. d d 132 in epen ence. 
Baker Pasha sent many reports to the Porte which 
d d f 1 133 H . . t . 1 were regar e as use u . e was in communica ion a so 
with Layard. He sent a confidential letter to Layard 
including his view of the issue. However, Layard wanted 
this communication to remain secret in order not to get 
the Pasha into trouble. 
us Ibid, p. 2. 
ll9 Ibid. 
Baker suspected that the 
130 Ibid, p.7. 
131 P.O. 424/106, p. 183-4, No. 87 in BDOA, Vol. I, No. 332, p. 
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"exceedingly anti-English, " 134 Suleyman Bey who was raised 
on the occasion to the rank of Pasha, had a telegraphic 
cipher and was constantly informing the Porte about his 
. it. 135 activ 1es. However, as we notice in the Ottoman 
documents Mehmed Said Pasha had the cipher and Baker was 
136 
right that his activities were being reported. 
Baker reported that the new regulations for the 
tribunals were beginning to work but civil and criminal 
procedures should be discriminated properly. He could not 
get a definite basis for the organization of the 
gendannery. "The provisional reorganization sent out some 
five months ago was a mere sham and the so called new 
force was already two or three months in arrears of pay." 
7- Parliamentary Elections in Britain and the Shift 
in Ottoman Policy 
The conviction of the Sultan that his own safety and 
the existence of his empire would be best secured by the 
alliance with Britain, even if Britain proved at times 
b h h . d . t. 11 137 t . d . 1 ot a ectoring an an 1nac 1ve a y, con 1nue unt1 
th 1 1 t . i'n B 't · ue e genera e ec ions ri ain. 
13
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725. 
135 P.O. 424/106, p. 201-2, No. 94/1 in BDQA, Vol. I, No. 340, p. 
687. 
136 YA-HUS 163/93. 
137 Medlicott, p. 315. 
138 The Porte was anxious about the change of government which took 
place in Britain . Abidin Pasha stated to Goschen that "at first 
when the (Cyprus) Convention was made he rejoiced on behalf of his 
country and considered that the guarantee of the remaining Asiatic 
dominions of Turkey by a power like Britain compensated, in a 
very large measure, the losses of territory they had incurred on 
that continent" but "since the change of government and since he 
read the speeches which had been made on the subject, he had 
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In the elections the Liberal Party under the 
leadership of Gladstone came to power and Disraeli 
suffered defeat. One of the first actions of Gladstone 
was to recall the "pro-Turkish ambassador" Layard from 
Istanbul. On May 6th, 1880, George Goschen, Member of 
Parliament for Ripon, 139 was appointed to Istanbul as the 
British Special Ambassador, with the requisite full 
d d . 1 uo . d t . th p powers an ere enti.a s, in or er o impress e orte 
by giving "the opportunity of learning from a Special 
Ambassador how grave Her Majesty's Government considered 
the present situation of affairs in the Ottoman Empire, 
and their determination to insist, in concert with the 
other Powers, upon the complete fulfillment by the Porte 
of its obligations under the Treaty of Berlin with 
respect to Greece, Montenegro and Armenia." 141 
Goschen' s appointment was at first resisted by the 
Porte as it was thought that his mission was to introduce 
a financial system similar to Egypt's. Earle Granville, 
the new British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 
assured the Porte that Goschen had no financial mission. 
Musurus Pasha also reported that during his membership of 
the Parliament Goschen did not advocate an anti-Ottoman 
doubted whether Turkey had gained the advantage of the (Cyprus) 
Convention. In reply Goschen declared that the Porte did not 
fulfill any of its promises and added that Baker Pasha had no 
executive powers and qualified men to deal with existing evils and 
abuses were absent; F.O. 424/107, p. 9-10, No. 10 in BDQA, Vol II, 
No. 22, p. 88. 
139 Walker, p. 123. 
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1 . 142 po icy. However, according to the report of a certain 
Riza Bey at the Porte who paid a visit to London, Musurus 
Pasha was beeing too optimistic about the British 
government and the real intention was to bring the Greek, 
Montenegrin and Armenian issues to a conclusion. 143 
Holding the belief that only the exercise of a 
united pressure could persuade the Porte, Earl Granville 
invited the Powers to address an identical and 
simultaneous note to the Porte, requesting the Turkish 
goverrunent to fulfill its treaty obligations with regard 
to Greece, Montenegro and to the Asian provinces (May 4th, 
1880} 144 and to call the Porte to state explicitly what 
steps had been taken. 145 Goschen' s consultations with the 
representatives of the other signatories of the Berlin 
Treaty resulted in the addressing to the Porte of the 
note verbal of June 11th, 1880. 146 
Upon his order, the Sultan was presented with a 
report which included those reforms which had been 
inaugurated and those which had been not. According to 
the report the Porte was also in favor of reforms. 
However, the reforms could not be introduced exclusively 
to the eastern Anatolian provinces, but to the whole 
country. 147 The reform project prepared for Rumeli would 
1'l YEE 35-37/I-138. 
1'J YEE 35-37112-138. 
1
" Turkey No. 7 (1880), p. 1-2, No. 2 in BDQA, Vol II, No. 1, p. 
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be reviewed and reshaped according to the conditions of 
th . 148 e region. 
th The reply of the Porte, which was dated July 5 , was 
not considered satisfactory by the powers. The Porte 
listed the measures taken and expressed its regrets at 
h ' f ' d ' ' 1 149 D di t e exaggeration o some JU icia cases. epen ng on 
the report of Abidin Pasha, Governor-general of Sivas, 
the Porte considered introducing the system of communes. 
According to this system kazas would be subdivided into 
communes, consisting of seven or eight villages grouped 
together with the idea of bringing together villages of 
one religion as far as possible. Where Armenians were in 
majority a Christian mudur (headman) would be selected by 
the population and this mudur would have a small number 
of "village police" for the service of the commune raised 
among the inhabitants. 150 
The British government approved Goschen' s proposal 
to draw up and present to the Grand Vizier a note 
recapitulating the worst cases "of abuse, anarchy, 
miscarriage of justice and insecurity of life and 
property in Anatolia. 11151 On September 7th the ambassadors 
gave a collective note verbal to the Porte pointing out 
that the Ottoman proposal did not meet either the spirit 
or the letter of the Treaty of Berlin. 152 In this note the 
148 Ibid. 
10 YEE 35-35/19-46-95. 
15° F.O. 424/106, p. 486-7, No. 238 in BDQA, Vol. II, No. 15, p. 
43. 
151 F.O. 424/107, p. 11, No. 14 in B.DQA, Vol. II, No. 26, p. 99. 
15l YEE 35-2334-50-97; Turkey No. 23 (1880), p. 279-82, No. 154/1 
in BDQA , Vol II, No. 32, p. 119. 
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Powers sought to exclude the Kurds from the reforms 
intended for "Armenia" and give them a separate 
dm • . t. 153 a inistra ion. According to them the sedentary 
Armenians and the semi-nomadic Kurdish tribes could not 
154 be governed in the same manner. 
On October 3rd, 1880, the note of September 7th was 
answered by the Porte. However, the course of the 
negotiations respecting the Greek frontier question 
showed that a joint action on the part of the Powers 
would not take place till the next September, thus, the 
British government agreed to defer any representations to 
be made to the Porte about the issue. 155 In the meantime, 
Goschen was recalled in May 1881 and Lord Dufferin was 
appointed to the post to "extort" reforms from the 
Sultan. However, Dufferin himself preferred persuasion to 
• 156 
extortion. 
On September 9th, 1881, the ambassadors met at the 
invitation of Dufferin and decided to address another 
note to the Foreign Minister, reinforcing the suggestions 
and demands embodied in the note of September 7th, 1880. 
They concluded that they would propose the introduction 
of a High Commissionary for the implementation of the 
reforms, and they had two names in their minds: Muhtar 
and Rauf 
153 Salt, 51. 
157 Pashas. Rauf Pasha was considered to be a 
15
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fitter person for the post, as being "very conciliatory 
and less fanatical, and more tolerant a Mussulman than 
Muhtar, who, however, was a very clever man, and had a 
158 greater knowledge of the country than Rauf. 
On October 4th, 1881, the ambassadors entrusted to 
Duf ferin and Novikoff the task of drafting a scheme of 
reforms, founded on the recommendations made by Sir 
Charles Wilson and Major Trotter. The scheme was 
submitted to a conference of the ambassadors on February 
1882, and received their 159 acceptance. However, 
Germany refused to act in concert with other European 
powers. In January 1882 an Ottoman delegation, composed 
of Mehmet Reshit Bey and Ali Nizami Pasha, paid a visit 
to Berlin in order to award a medal to the German 
160 Emperor. During the negotiations both parties' 
intention of a treaty of alliance were revealed. The 
Ottoman delegation asked for the assistance of German 
officials. Bismarck anticipated the future Turkish policy 
during these negotiations. He continually adviced the 
delegates that the Ottoman state should rely on its 
Turkish and Muslim subjects. 161 The Christians had proved 
their disloyalty on many occasions and the Ottomans 
should govern them with a 11 lion' s claw that wore a silk 
162 glove." 
158 P.O. 424/123, 
318. 
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Germany was conscious that Ottoman Empire had no 
supporter in the European political arena, and tried to 
make use of this lack for her imperialistic causes. 
Bismarck advised "In a dispatch from Berlin on May 1883 
the British ambassador, Lord Ampthill, noted that 
Bismarck was basically prepared to act in concert with 
the other Powers. Over one question, however, he could 
not follow Britain: the Armenian Question. He claimed 
that the constant pressure on the Sultan humiliated him 
in the eyes of his subjects, and weakened him in the eyes 
of his enemies; besides, interference with the happiness 
of other sovereigns' subjects was philanthropy, and he 
hated philanthropy in politics. 11163 
Austrian policy ran along the sae line as the German 
one. Bismarck stated that any treaty signed with Austria 
meant that it was 164 signed also with Germany. Austrian 
diplomats informed their British colleagues on many 
occasions that Austria did not have any .direct interest 
' th b ' 165 A ' b ' 1 ' t in e su Ject. ustria was o vious y trying o protect 
her improving relations with the Ottoman Empire. 
8- Recovery of Sovereignty 
In October 1878, the Porte promised to place some 
foreign officers on the Central Council of the Gendarmery 
and to employ them in that force when constituted, to 
L63 Walker, p. 124. 
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appoint some foreign lawyers to superintend the 
Tribunals, and to introduce, with the assistance of 
foreign functionaries, a new system of tax collection to 
supersede oshur. The governors of provinces, magistrates, 
and receivers of revenue should be immune from dismissal 
except for misconduct, and should be appointed for at 
least five years. However, little was done towards the 
execution of these promises. The Porte appointed foreign 
inspectors of finance, but they did not have real 
authority and thus, two Englishmen resigned from the job. 
The Porte also appointed judicial inspectors for the 
provinces, but this measure aggravated the situation. 166 
According to the reports of Layard, the rule of retaining 
the Valis in their posts for a fixed period had been 
broken, and no efficient steps had been taken for the 
i t . f h d 167 d . h proper organ za ion o t e gen armery. Accor ing to t e 
dispatches of May 1880, the English officers who had been 
engaged to proceed to Turkey to organize the gendarmery, 
but whose employment had always been steadily opposed by 
Osman Pasha and the 'retrograde party' at the Palace, 
remained without position or pay and were about to be 
sent back to Britain. 168 Consequently, the network of 
British military consuls was relinquished in 1885 as it 
was found to be unproductive. 169 
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The most important obstacle to the application of 
the reforms noted by the Sultan was the lack of funds. 
The Sultan had many times asked for British help to 
obtain a loan. However, there was no hope of .guaranteeing 
a loan to the Porte "because of the temper of the 
Parliament, whose members believed that Britain's 
financial obligations were already too great and that 
Turkey was unworthy of 170 confidence. In return for 
Layard's appeals for help, Salisbury advised Turkey to be 
"her own friend in matters of finance. 11171 
The Sultan was busy with other problems like the 
trial of Mithat Pasha and his colleagues which caused the 
utmost trouble for him. 1n 
The Sultan was inclined to establish a despotic 
administration after the British general elections of 
1880. Ottoman expectations of British support against the 
Russian threat expired as the anti-Ottoman Gladstone's 
victory meant the preference of a Russian alliance by the 
British people. There was no need to seem to be in 
cooperation with Britain any more. In 1881 censorship 
paralyzed the Ottoman press and to exert control over 
internal travels, the internal passport (murur tezkeresi) 
was strictly enforced. 173 However, after the occupation of 
Egypt by Britain, Tsar Alexander III, who succeded to the 
170 Lee, p. 152. 
171 Ibid. 
ln P.O. 424/123, p. 66A-66B, No. 40. in B.DQA, Vol. II, No. 84, p. 
263. 
173 Aksin, Sina (ed.). 'l':iirkiye Tarihi. Vol. 3. Istanbul: Cem 
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throne after the assassination of the "liberal" Alexander 
II by narodniks, wooed the Porte constantly. This gave 
h S lt f h d t mb t th E 1 . h 174 t e u an a ree an o co a e ng is pressure. 
The new Tsar had not only canceled Melikof 's Armenian 
project, but launched the policy of Russification of his 
175 Armenian subjects as well. 
With the invasion of Egypt, Britain secured the 
Indian route on the most sound basis and the Armenian 
Question became less important for Britain. This can be 
observed by the decrease in the number of the British 
documents about the issue. There are hundreds of 
documents ref erring to this matter from the previous 
years, but, for the year 1884 only fourteen and for 1885 
five British documents exist in Simsir' s compilation of 
British documents on the issue. After 1883 all of the 
documens are about mere instances concerning the Armenian 
population in the region. The Blue Books of the British 
government on the Armenian Question disappeared in 1881 
and did not reappear until 1889. These compiled documents 
of British diplomacy had been published after few months 
from the date of the last document, in order to inform 
the public. However, in 1884, only one Blue Book was 
published, and even then was distributed only inside the 
1 . tl76 par iamen which shows 
'failure' on the issue. 
1
" Zeidner, p. 481. 
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In the 1880s European powers were deeply concerned 
with their own domestic and imperialistic affairs. In 
1881 France occupied Tunis, in 1882 Britain occupied 
Egypt. Germany was reforging her hegemony over the 
continent by means of the Dual Alliance with Austria in 
1879, the revival of the League of the Three Emperors in 
1881, and the creation of the Triple Alliance between 
Germany, Austria and Italy in 1882. 177 
Moreover, in the 1880s continental Great Powers had 
conservative governments and they were not in a mood to 
sympathize with the revolutionary Armenian aims. Bismarck 
was in trouble with the marxist Social Democrat Party. In 
Russia, Alexander II's successor Alexander III showed no 
h 1 . . 178 mercy to t e revo utionists. 
Thus, in the 1880s increasingly conflicting imperial 
and commercial interests of the European states in the 
Ottoman Empire prevented joint action on the issue and 
gave the Sul tan a free hand to deal with the Armenian 
Question and restore his sovereignty. 





Between 1878 and 1885, the Armenian Question 
reappeared in these forms: as a political squabble 
between the Liberals and the Conservatives in the British 
Parliament, a clash between the nomadic Kurds and 
sedentary Armenians, an effort by the British government 
to dominate the Ottoman government, and most importantly, 
an international clash between Russia and Britain. 
The pattern of exploitation of the Armenian Question 
as a reflection of party politics found its most clear 
expression in the statement of William Summers, a liberal 
Member of Parliament: 1'Gladstone and I are involved in 
the Armenian Question for the sole purpose of causing 
difficulties to the Salisbury Cabinet."1 Hence, under the 
pretext of "humanitarian intervention" the Armenian 
problem became subordinate to domestic British politics. 
The assimilation of the Kurds, who could 
counterbalance the Armenian revolutionary movement, into 
the Ottoman system was more important for the Porte than 
introducing reforms for the benefit of the Armenians. 
Abdulhamid's policy supported the Kurds against the 
Armenians, a fact which became obvious with the emergence 
of the Hamidiye Regiments. 
1 Dadrian, p. 63. 
The only possibility for the execution of the 
reforms was foreign 
effective because of 
pressure, which could 





Powers. After the occupation of Egypt by Britain, Russia 
turned her face to Turkey and the essential fear of the 
Porte that Anatolia would disintegrate terminated. 
For the Armenians' part, the Armenian leadership 
made several miscalculations. They underestimated the 
international realities of the time, namely the Russo-
British rivalry over the region. Their misfortune 
compared to their fellow Christians in the Balkans, I 
think, was not their a being minority in the region, as 
suggested by some writers, but was the region's 
strategical importance. 
One may consider that a nation's revolt can not be 
reduced to the deeds of imperialist powers. Certainly, 
the origins of Armenian nationalism is older than the 
Turco-Russian War, however, the Armenian Question emerged 
at least as a geographical issue after this dispute. The 
immediate disappearance of the question from the 
international fora after the British occupation of Egypt 
provides proof of this thesis. 
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